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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE STUDY OF THE RESULTS OF PRISON PUNISHMENTS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW.

GEORGE

W.

KmCHWEY. 1

The statement of my theme involves two fundamental assumptions, both calling for examination: the first, that the system of
penal imprisonment involves results requiring and capable of investigation; the second, that the study of those results may be
expected to bear fruit in the modification or amendment of the
law by which that system is created and supported. And, as our
criminal law is the expression either of the public will or of the
will, of certain ascertainable elements in the community, there is
a further implication that that will is modifiable and capable of
being influenced by the facts that may be brought to light by the
study proposed.
These assumptions are, indeed, the axioms of our science,
and it is because we accept them unreservedly that we are assembled here on this occasion. But, if I rightly apprehend the aims
and purposes of this Congress, we are not here primarily as propagandists but as men of science, and as such we may not accept
even the axioms of our high calling without examination of their
scope and the method and limits of their application to the problems which we have set ourselves to solve.
What I have proposed to myself as the object of this paper
is an analytical study of the conditions affecting the progressive
reform of our criminal law and procedure, with special reference
to the agencies through which such reform must be effected and
the motives which affect those agencies. The obvious recourse in
such an inquiry is history, especially the history of the criminal
law and its administration. But, while the study of our AngloAmerican legal history throws a flood of light on the relations
between public opinion and criminal law, it has, I venture to think,
a disappointment in store for those who look to it for a confirmation of the implications of the thesis at the head of this paper.
'Kent, Professor of Law in Columbia University.
This article is a revised and expanded edition of a paper read before the
International Prison Congress at Washington in October, 1go.
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There is, in fact, little to support the view that our criminal law
and procedure have been largely determined by experiments with
punitive measures. We have a record of a thousand years in
which the tide of brutality ebbs and flows, but there is no sign of
any reaction of the known conditions of prison punishment on
the agencies making for the amendment of the criminal law, either
on grounds of humanity or of expediency, up to the beginning
of the last century. It was only when the artificial and hideous
system of English penal justice broke down of its own weight,
when judges and juries combined to render the death penalty an
empty threat, that conditions began to improve; but the removal
of the death penalty from a multitude of offenses meant more and
more convictions and a consequent enormous increase in the number of those condemned to penal servitude and imprisonment; and
though the exposure by Howard and others of the shocking enormities of the prison system in England and on the Continent resulted
in important reforms in the management of penal institutions and
of the conditions of prison life, it would, I venture to say, be -hard
to trace any effect of these or of subsequent disclosures in the
general criminal law or its ordinary administration. The hard
truth is that the attitude toward the criminal of the English and,
to a considerable though a less degree, of the American public
has been such as to render them impervious to the sentiments
which the horrors of prison punishment would naturally excite. It
was not until the humanitarian sentiment which has attended the
growth of our western civilization had risen to a flood that it began to percolate into that last bulwark of barbarism. In that
long period of waiting for the dawn of the new day the attitude
of the law toward the criminal, which can only be described as one
of ferocity, fairly reflected the sentiments of horror and hatred
with which he was regarded by the law-making elements of the
community.
Here we may profitably turn to a few moments' consideration of the agencies by which the character of the criminal law
is determined. We are in the habit of speaking of law, especially
under a popular form of government, as the expression of public
opinion, but a study of our criminal jurisprudence shows that
public opinion in the sense in which that phrase is commonly employed, as a general sentiment pervading the community, has
upon the whole had little to do with either the content or the
administration of that system. Professor Dicey has recently re-
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minded us 2 that the opinion which directs the development of the
law may not be the opinion of the community at large but that
of a ruling class or of interests powerful enough under existing
political conditions to make their influence controlling. Thus,
while it cannot be denied that important and salutary changes
in the criminal law have from time to time been made in deference
to public opinion, and that in such countries as England and the
United States public opinion in the widest sense of that expression has the potentiality to effect any changes that it may desire
in the law of the land, it is submitted that the criminal law of those
countries, as it now exists, is in the main representative not of the
will of the community as a whole, but rather of class sentiment,
and particularly of the sentiment of those-criminal judges and
prosecuting attorneys-to whom the administration of the crimiial law is committed. This is particularly true of England, where
the committing magistrates as well as the higher officers of the
law are chosen from the gentry. An ingenious English writer
of the middle of the last century gave pointed expression to this
fact by asking, "Who can doubt that, if the poor and not the
rich had the making of the laws, the rule of crime and punishment
would be vastly different from what it is at present? Trifling
offenses against property would never then have been made the
highest crimes, for it would not have been the interest of the lawgivers to punish them most heavily. Was it on the principle of
estimating a crime by its guilt or by its injury to society that
sheep-stealing was punished with death while adultery was not a
crime at all? . . . Surely, because it was for the interest of
the higher orders that the laws were made."'
Speaking generally, it may be said that the attitude of the
public has been negative, one of callous indifference to the fate of
the wrong-doer, while the professional opinion, by which that fate
was mostly determined, has been but too firmly convinced of the
wisdom and justice of the Draconian code which it administered.
That I have not exaggerated in describing this professional
sentiment as one of horror and hatred is easily demonstrated by
turning to the pages of the late Mr. Justice Stephen's "History
of the Criminal Law of England,"' where the right and the duty
'A. V. Dicey, "The Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England,"
1905, P- 9-

'C. Estlin Prichard, "On the Principles and Objects of Human Punishments,"

an essay read in the theater, Oxford, June

'Vol. 1, 478; Vol. II, 75-93.

20,

1844 (p. 44).
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of entertaining sentiments of hatred and revenge against the criminal are eloquently asserted; and that these sentiments have actually
entered into and determined the course of the law is declared by
the same eminent authority: "The criminal law thus proceeds upon
the principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments which express it."' While it would probably not be fair
to take the views of M'Ar. Justice Stephen as a correct expression
of the sentiment of his class at the present time, it would not be
difficult, I think, to show that his opinion is still largely entertained
by criminal judges, and perhaps by the legal profession generally,6 but his condemnation of the "misplaced and exaggerated
tenderness which has come to prevail on the subject in the community at large' 7 is a convincing demonstration of the fact that
the indifference and callousness of the public are at an end.
These facts would seem to point to public opinion rather than
to the more obdurate professional opinion as the agency of amelioration; but this, I believe, is a mistake. The slowness with
which public opinion is formed, its sluggishness and discontinuity
will probably continue to give the ;interested and .professional
classes a controlling influence on the course of the criminal law
and its administration, and it would seem to be the part of wisdom for those interested in criminal law and prison reform to
address themselves primarily to the task of educating and forming
the professional and expert opinion upon whose attitude so much
depends.'
But before we undertake this task or the much more serious
one of informing and rousing public opinion, it is incumbent upon
us to pause and inquire what the best method of approach may
be, and it is here that our real difficulties begin. For the opinion,
public or professional, which sustains our present penal system is
based- on certain set beliefs or convictions as to the true and
81.
'Vol. II,
'A striking instance was the declaration of a well-known prosecuting officer,
made about a year ago in New York, in the presence of a group of gentlemen
interested in criminal reform, that "a criminal is a wild beast and should be
treated as such."
'Stephen, Vol. II, p. 93.
'Much may be hoped in this respect from the new American Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology, which has many judges and lawyers among its
members, and from scientific gatherings such as this, where eminent jurists, criminologists and prison reformers meet and discuss with calmness and high intelligence the problems in which they are all alike interested.
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proper end of punishment for crime, and these beliefs are many
and widely divergent.
The policy of penal imprisonment, for example, may be supported on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) As a satisfaction of the sentiments of hatred and revenge which crime is calculated to excite, primarily in the victim
and his family and friends, and then in lessening degree among
others;
(b) As a means of redress or reparation of the wrong done,
that the disturbed balance of justice between the offender and his
victim may be restored;
(c)
As a vindication of the outraged peace and dignity of
the state, and (c') as an expression of its reprobation of the
offense committed;
(d) As an example to evil doers, and thus a restraining
influence on others tempted to commit crime;
(e)
As a salutary lesson to the offender, to bring home to
him the truth that the way of the transgressor is hard;
(f) As a forcible means of orestraining the offender, thus
preventing him, during the period of his confinement, from further indulgence of his criminal propensities;
(g)
As a means of moral amendment-that the soul may
be purged through suffering;
(h) As creating a break in the habits and associations
which have led to crime;
(i)
As a necessary social provision for bringing new and
more wholesome influences to bear on the wrong-doer in the hope
of converting him into a useful member of the community.
It is to this diversity of ends, this complexity of motives
affecting the question of prison punishments that most of the
difficulties which attend all efforts for the reform of existing conditions are due.
There is a grim though unconscious humor in the criticism
leveled by Recorder Cox at the Prison Congress which met at
London in 1874. "If the Congress had commenced its useful labors
by determining what should be deemed the .proper purpose of punishment," he says, "three-fourths of its work would have been
saved and its results would have been more fruitful of good."' To
this we can all say, Amen! assuming that there is only one purpose
or only one "proper purpose" of punishment. But when there
'E. W. Cox, "The Principles of Punishment,"
722

2.
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are many purposes, all of them valid and all entering into the
actual determination of the provisions of the penal code, the unanimity demanded of the Congress is hardly to be looked for. And
then, too, however united in sentiment and conviction, even Prison
Congresses have to deal with things as they are and with practical means for making them what they ought to be. Can we by
our votes make that not to be which is? The bare fact that confronts us is this: that the diversity of opinions which way be held
as to the end or purpose of punishment is actually held by those
members of the community, whether few or many, whose will finds
expression in the criminal law, and that, while some of these purposes may be combined in the punishment prescribed for a given
offense, others are inconsistent and can only be effected at the
expense of one or more of the rest. Further, whether the ends
proposed are mutually exclusive or susceptible of combination, the
principle of punishment, by which the penalties of the law are
measured and apportioned, will vary according to the importance
which may by the law-making or law-administering authority be
assigned to one purpose in comparison with others. Thus if the
chief end in view be the vindication of the justice of the state or
the satisfaction of the outraged feelings of the community, the
punishment to be applied can hardly fail to depend to a considerable degree on the moral guilt of the wrong-doer; while, if the
aim be repression by example, acts which men are most liable to
commit, where temptation is greatest and the moral guilt therefore presumably least, may invite the severest penalties.
The application of these principles is further complicated by
the growing recognition of the fact that there is no single forraula which covers all persons convicted of infractions of the criminal code. Whether we believe or do not believe in the existence
of a "criminal type," whether we accept or reject the theory that
the criminal, like the poet, "is born, not made," we can hardly
shut our eyes to the fact that the accidental or casual criminal
differs in important respects-in social undesirableness as well as
in his mental and moral outfit-from the habitual or instinctive
criminal, and that these may differ as widely from each other;
nor can we reject the inference that motives for punishment of
the one class may have little or no application to individuals belonging to another class.
It is no part of the purpose of this paper to attempt a complete valuation of the several ends to which prison punishment
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may be directed; all of the motives enumerated above are practically if not philosophically valid, and we can all agree that most
if not all of them should be aimed at in a properly devised penal
system. My object is the more modest one of indicating briefly
what the study of conditions past and present may be expected
to teach us with respect to the actual influence of these several
motives and how that study may be most advantageously directed.
First, as to the vindictive or retaliatory purpose of punishment, it is obvious that this does still, to a considerable degree,
color our criminal jurisprudence, and that the principles upon
which it is founded do in fact enter to a considerable extent into
the sentiments of those elements in the community by which our
criminal law is actually shaped and administered. Mr. Justice
Stephen's assertion of the right and duty of entertaining and
giving effect to these sentiments has already been referred to, as
has also the dramatic expression of the same attitude by a member
of the American bar still prominently identified with the prosecution of criminals in one of our large cities.'0
The language of
borror and indignation habitually employed by judges in sentencing criminals convicted of atrocious crimes, the very fact of
the survival of the term "atrocious" in connection with certain
crimes, furnish abundant evidence of the persistence of this sentimnent in the law.
Is there a place for this principle of retaliation in a sound
system of penal law? Plato answers this question emphatically
in the negative. "No one punishes the evil-doer under the notion
or for the reason that he has done wrong; only the unreasonable
fury of a beast acts in that manner. . . . Who desires to
ir-flict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong
which cannot be undone."'" But Plato, unaware of the derivation
of our human nature from the beast, imputes even to the Athenians
of his day a philosophic attitude toward the criminal which belongs
rather to the ideal republic governed by the principles of pure
reason than to the actual Athens of his time. That in a rational
system there is no room for the rage of the beast, that it cornports neither with the dignity nor the moral integrity of the state
to act as the agent of the individual in executing vengeance on
the wrong-doer, will of course be admitted without argument. But
"it is a condition, not a theory, that confronts us," and the ques"°Page 721, supra.
' 1Protagoras, 324. (Jowett's translation.)
724
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tion still remains whether, in human society as we find it in these
opening years of the twentieth century, some concession must not
yet be made to "the ape and tiger" which survive in our common
heritage of humanity. It is doubtless true that in the most orderly communities, where the reign of law is fully established, and
in the case of most offenses, the principle of revenge is a diminishing element in the criminal law and that it tends constantly to
disappear. But our criminal law must represent the prejudices as
well as the humanity of the community, its fury as well as its pity,
and a law which from this point of view errs on the side of mildness
may be as ineffective as one which errs on the side of harshness. In
the latter case courts and juries will refuse to convict; in the former
the ordinary procedure of the courts will be superseded by mob
violence. The prevalence of "lynch law" in certain backward communities would seem to point to the existence of a social demand in
those communities for more rigorous dealing with crimes of certain
sorts than the ordinary criminal law provides. As practical men,
therefore, dealing, as we must, with actual conditions, we may, however reluctantly, be compelled deliberately to frame and administer
our criminal law so as to admit the principle of revenge to a limited
extent, for such time as may be required to bring the community
to a better mind. What is here needed is education and the development of a sentiment of respect for the law through the prompt
and orderly administration of justice through its established instrumentalities.
Second. This, which may be called the compensatory or retributive purpose of punishment, presents a double aspect, according as it is viewed from the standpoint of the individual directly
affected by the criminal act or of the community whose standards
of justice are infringed by it. Primarily it aims at restitution
or reparation made, wherever that is possible, to the injured party;
derivatively it seeks to satisfy the sense of justice of the community.
Eliminating entirely the element of passion or revenge, there can
be no doubt that to most men and women justice continues "topresent itself as a balancing of the scales of merit and demerit-on
the one side the wrong, on the other the compensating penalty.
Applied with naive literalness in the primitive codes of the race
("an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"), supported by
philosophy' as well as by popular opinion," it is still a potent
"Aristotle, Ethics VII: Kant, Rechtslehre, II, i. e., F. N. Bradley, Ethical
25. However, the weight of modern philosophic opinion is against this
view.
Studies,
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force in our criminal jurisprudence.14 The provision of the English
law which couples penal servitude with the indeterminate sentence
is avowedly based on this principle,1 and the sentiment to which
it gives expresion is doubtless the chief obstacle to the general
acceptance of the reformatory principle of 'Punishment.
Linked, as it is, on the one side to the moral law, on the
other -to the laws of nature, rooted in the noblest and most permanent sentiment of our humanity, the passion for justice, there
is a satisfying quality in this ideal conception of the justice of
the state which must appeal to all.
If justice were an end in itself, or if our human justice were an
emanation of that law "whose seat is the bosom of God, whose
voice is the harmony of the world," we should, indeed, be compelled to recognize the validity, nay, the sufficiency, of the principle of expiation. But if, as we hold, justice is but a means to
a further end, the progressive amelioration of life in society, then
we may well question the validity of the principle of retributive
punishment; and if we find that, however complete in itself, it
tends to defeat that ultimate aim of human betterment, we shall
be compelled to reject it as a purpose to be aimed at in a sound
penal system. The principle of atonement has its place in the
natural as well as in the spiritual order; but, in the one as in the
other, the mechanical interpretation to which it too easily- lends
itself makes it a dangerous one to invoke. This has been clearly
demonstrated in the experience of society in the field of criminal
law. It has placed the community in the attitude of saying to
the offender, "Now that you have paid the penalty of your crime,
you may go and sin again;" and it has too often led the criminal
to feel that, having paid the penalty of his crime, his account with
society is squared.
But it is necessary again to remember that we are not engaged in framing an ideal code. A principle which demonstrably
"As expressed in the maxim, "Let the punishment fit the crime."
""It may be affirmed that the most natural idea of the magistrate and the
most usual * * * is that punishment is exacted, not merely in order that
crimes may not be committed, but because an evil deed has been done."--C. Estlin
Prichard, ubi supra, 28.
"The law affords a very clear proof that its real purpose is to administer
retributive justice and that punishment has no end beyond itself," etc.-J. A.
Farrer, "Crimes and Punishments," i8go, p. 8o.

"See paper of Sir E. Ruggles-Brise on "Professional Criminals," contributed

to the International Prison Congress, held at Brussels in i9oo.
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lacks rational justification may still have a present validity, and
it is submitted that we are not at liberty in a consideration of the
purposes of punishment for the world of to-day to ignore a sentiment so deep-seated and keenly felt as that of retribution for
wrong done. But this is not to admit its eternal validity nor
even its present advantage either to society or to the individual
who comes under that iron law, but, at the most, its temporary
necessity.
Third. The vindicatory .or ethical purpose of punishment,
as I venture to designate it, stands on higher ground than either
of those heretofore considered, inasmuch as its aim, though also
punitive, is fundamentally corrective. The conception of the state
as essentially moral and of its function as that of a potent agency
for encouraging and sustaining the higher life furnish a philosophical basis for penal legislation inspired by that aim, while
we must recognize, even if we can but dimly discern, the salutary
effects of the principle in action. It must, I think,' be admitted,
that society should, in some commanding and even dramatic form,
give expression to the principles upon which it is based, that the
weak will may be made strong and the current morality heightened
by such affirmation, that "the everlasting yea" and "the everlasting nay" have not lost their power over the hearts of men. We
might, indeed, give unhesitating assent to the application of a
principle so elevated and salutary were it not for the fact that
its administration is so apt to be complicated by considerations,
still more by feelings, drawn from the principles of punishment
already examined by us and condemned.
I conceive that this danger may be largely obviated by persistence in certain lines of investigation into which the new sciences of psychology, anthropology and sociology invite us and
by a study of the social and personal history of the individual
wrong-doer, including his heredity and pathology, physical and
mental. A demonstration of the fact, which we may well consider indubitable, that criminal conduct is usually, -if not always,
the result of conditions more or less beyond the control of the
delinquent, cannot fail to shake the theory of moral responsibility
on which the vindictive and retributive principles of punishment
are based, as well as to allay and in time overcome the feeling of
resentment which such conduct now excites. Emphasizing the
moral capacity rather than the moral responsibility of the citizen,
the ethical principle of punishment has nothing to lose but much
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to gain from an investigation which will set forth in clearer relief
his capacity for responding to the insistence of society on a wellordered life. In this connection much may be hoped from the
study of social history and from the realizing sense which such
study will bring home to us of the extent to which the current
morality depends upon the institutions and social relations which
are the best fruits of our civilization and which constitute the
chief safeguards of the social virtues. We shall thus come to
understand that the "normal man" is not only the man of normal
impulses, but the man of normal impulses placed in a normal
environment. The strongest of us need the safeguards provided
by society for the conduct of life. Our weaker brethren need not
worse but better conditions, not weaker but stronger incentives to
right living than those by whose aid we tread the narrow path.
Fourth. The exemplary or deterrent theory of punishment
has a long history. Maintained by Plato"8 and other philosophers
of the ancient and modern world,"7 it has become the orthodox
view of the purpose of punishment 8 and the most important factor
in the shaping of our criminal law and its administration."
It
reached its completest expression in the hideous cruelties of the
English penal law of a century ago with its grotesque multiplication of capital offenses, and there is no reason to believe that the
collapse of that system, to which reference has already been made,
was influenced to any considerable extent by doubts as to the validity of the principle which it exemplified. There is something touching in the unquestioning faith of the legal profession on the one
hand, and of the man in the street on the other, in the efficacy of
this vicarious suffering for crimes not yet committed.
Yet it
remains a matter of faith almost wholly unsupported by evidence.
The proof furnished by experience is thus far wholly negativethat the deterrent effect of punishment, if any there be, does not
depend on the degree or kind of penalty inflicted; or rather that
excessive punishments defeat the end in view by inducing a reck1

"Protagoras, 324; Laws, IX, 862; XI, 934.
"Seneca, De Ira, I, i6; Hobbes, Leviathan II, c. 28;
T. H. Green, "Principles of Political Obligation," II, 178, ,87-2o6.
"Sir Edmund F. DuCane, "The Punishment and Prevention of Crime;"
Edward A. Cox, "The Principles of Punishment." See also the address of Sir F
Ruggles-Brise, delivered before the American Prison Association, in Washington,
D. C., October 2, I9io, The Survey, XXV, 179.
"Illustrated in the familiar story of the English judge passing sentence on a
horse thief: "You are sentenced to be hanged, not because you stole a horse, but
in order to prevent others from stealing horses." The principle finds frequent
expression in judicial language..
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less disregard of consequences as well as by stimulating a hatred
for the law because of its injustice and oppressiveness."0
On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that there is a substantial foundation in human experience for this deep-seated conviction as to the deterrent effect of terror inspired by the threat
of punishment for wrong-doing. But that this result may be attained the threat must be made good, the penalty prescribed by
law must actually and in the majority of cases follow speedily on
its infraction. That the certainty, or even the probability, of
swift detection and punishment would in very many instances
deter from wrong-doing is a fact that needs no demonstration:
but can any deterrent effect be attributed to a system of criminal
administration like that of the United States, which can only be
described as casual in its operation, where the offender faces a
rare prospect of punishment following a still rarer discovery and
conviction?"
In a community whose criminal administration can
thus be described it can truthfully be said that the law has no
terror for evil-doers and fails completely to realize its deterrent
purpose.
The obvious remedy for this condition of affairs is the progressive improvement of the entire system of criminal administration from the police and detective system at the one extreme to
the exercise of the pardoning power at the other.
But when this has been accomplished there will still remain
the problem-never, perhaps, to be completely solved-of the apportionment of penalties to secure the maximum deterrent effect
with respect to crimes of different sorts and upon criminals of different types. As an aid in its solution, well-considered experiments
in repressive legislation aimed at crimes of frequent occurrence.
or, on occasion, increased severity on the part of criminal magistrates, as in the substitution of imprisonment for fines, together with
careful observation of the effects of such action, might be expected
"See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, VI, c. 12; Beccaria, c. XV, XVI:
"This useless prodigality of punishments, by which men have never been made
any better." There is a declaration to the same effect in the Constitution of the
State of New Hampshire, Part I, Art. 18.
'Even in England, where the administration of the criminal law is much
more efficient than in the United States, it would appear that less than 25 per cent
of crimes reported to the police are followed by conviction. Farrer, 93; Hill,
Crime, 28. In this country the percentage of convictions must be further corrected for the numerous instances in which conviction is not followed by punishment.
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to yield results of some value, 22 while the continued study of criminal psychology and criminal anthropology can hardly fail to
demonstrate the fact that upon a large element of the criminal population the penalties of the law have no deterrent influence whatever.
Fifth. As to the deterrent effect of punishment on the offender
(a secondary object of penal legislation, according to DuCane,
Cox and other modern authorities), we already have data of considerable value in the statistics of recidivism. The fact that a
very large proportion-in some countries more than 50 per centof the criminals under confinement have previously undergone
prison punishment seems to indicate that as a lesson to the offender
punishment by imprisonment leaves something to be desired. But
it is only fair to observe that the facts at present available are
wholly insufficient to serve as a foundation for a definite conclusion. The study of recidivism must be further pursued with special
reference, on the one hand, to the kind of offenses which are repeatedly committed 'and, on the other hand, to the nature of the
imprisonment previously undergone -whether
separate or communal, whether in idleness or at hard labor, whether under humane
and reformatory conditions or under those that have heretofore
characterized our penal institutions. Such study should lead to
trustworthy inferences as to the extent to which prison conditions
have been responsible for the vicious habits and tendencies which
converted the first offender into an habitual criminal and thus
in some measure modify the unfavorable conclusions which the
statistics suggest as to the deterrent effect of punishment per se
upon the individual subjected thereto.
Sixth. The principle of preventing further violations of the
law by the confinement of the lawbreaker has played a considerable role in our criminal jurisprudence and has furnished a justification for sentences of long imprisonment, especially in the case
of hardened or desperate criminals.
Of course this .remedy is
efficacious while it lasts, the principal objection to its application
hitherto being that, not being based on any adequate study of the
offender and of the conditions determining his criminal career, it
has been indiscriminate and without method. If restricted, as it
should be, to those in whom a criminal habit or tendency has been
established, it will certainly be more sparingly employed than has
frequently been the case in the past. The further fact that, not
=See the instance cited by Recorder E. W. Cox out of his own experience as
a magistrate, "The Principles of Punishment," 36.
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being attended by corrective or reformatory influences but rather
the reverse, the application of this principle has too often had the
effect of confirming criminal tendencies or of creating them where
they did not exist before, has made of it a social menace instead
of the protective device which it aimed to be. This reproach has
now to a large extent been removed by the rise and development
of, the reformatory treatment of criminals, and this has rendered
possible the extreme application of the principle of preventive
restraint-the indeterminate sentence. Under these conditions the
prison and subsequent history of the criminal opens up a new and
inviting field of study which may be expected to yield rich results.
Seventh. The principle that punishment for crime may, quite
apart from the fear inspired and without the addition of reformatory influences, be a means of moral amendment, finds expression
in many judicial utterances. It is obviously a well-meant but
mistaken attempt to bring the sanctions of the moral law and of
the ecclesiastical dispensation to the aid of the criminal law. As
the soul is purged by suffering, as the contrite heart is purified
by penance, so may the criminal find means of grace in the pains
and penalties imposed by the law he has violated. Of course this
doctrine imputes to the law a sanctity which the criminal who
finds himself in its toils would be the last to concede to it; and so,
quite apart from the vile and degrading conditions under which
this work of grace was to be effected, it is not to be wondered at
that we find no traces of its efficacy. It is, perhaps, within the
bounds of possibility that under a penal system in which selfrespect and manhood are restored there may come to some of those
who undergo that discipline a sentiment of gratitude which will
transmute the punishment into a means of moral regeneration.
Eighth. The theory that confinement in prison for a longer
or shorter time is an efficient means of weaning the criminal from
the habits and associations which have brought him to a life of
crime has had little to commend it during that long period-unhappily not yet past-when the prisons supplied associations and
inculcated habits as vile and demoralizing as any that existed
outside its walls. Under the new dispensation, which we are here
to hasten, the theory acquires a new meaning which makes it susceptible of wide application. Even where the influences of prison
life are purely negative and the prisoner is merely protected
against moral contamination (if such condition can exist), the
principle is a valid one. Where, in addition, reformatory influ-
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ences are brought to bear we find ourselves under the benign conditions which will next be described. A study of the domestic and
social environment of the individual criminal, especially in the
case of a first offender, will throw light upon the question of the
length of confinement necessary in a given case to permit the dispersion of the group of bad companions who may be responsible
for his downfall or to permit charitable' or other social agencies to
create more favorable conditions to receive him on his release.
Ninth. The principle of the reformation of criminals through
the experiences of a prison life adapted to that end is too well known
to my audience to require explanation. -3 It claims to attain all the
proposed objects of prison punishment, in so far as these are attainable and desirable, and to provide conditions which make some of
them feasible and salutary when without its aid they would fail of
their object or prove pernicious in operation. It does not assume
that all criminals are susceptible of reformation, or even of improvement, nor that those who are can all be brought up to the same
level of good citizenship. It does assume, however, that most
men and women and all children will respond to the steady pressure
of a wholesome, uplifting environment, and that the vast majority
of those who come under its influence are capable of becoming
useful members of society; and it has already, in the brief term
of the experiment, proven its faith by its works. It has opened
up a vast field of investigation and study-the field of human
nature, in its normal and abnormal manifestations. It must have
cognizance of the life-history of every individual committed to
prison, with his heredity and environment. It studies him in
prison-his needs, his capacities, his aspirations, his mental and
moral equipment, his health and his reaction to the various experiences of prison life; it follows him after his discharge and studies
further the effect upon character and circumstances of his experience" of life as a free man. It levies on all the sciences that deal
with man-law, medicine, criminology, sociology-and seeks through
these to interpret and generalize the extensive data so gathered.
We are now prepared to answer in general terms the question of the influence of the study of prison punishment upon the
criminal law of England and the United States. As has been said
above, no change in the law of any importance can be traced to
the study or to the general knowledge of prison conditions prior
'Reformation and not vindictive justice is in several state constitutions declared to be the purpose of the penal code. See constitutions of New Hampshire, Indiana, Oregon, North Carolina and South Carolina.
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to the last century. It was due to such study, however, that
prison conditions in themselves underwent important changes, beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and continuing without interruption down to our own time. It was the
breakdown of the Australian convict system that marked the first
feeble beginnings of legal (as distinguished from prison) reform
in England about the middle of the last century, and the same
feeble and tentative gropings toward better things appeared in
this country in the barren period from 1825 to 1869, when the
act establishing the Elmira Reformatory was passed by the New
York legislature. It is from this latter date that we must reckon
the period of criminal law reform, based on a consideration of
the effects of prison punishment on the criminal and on the community at large. It was the shocking conditions of prison life
and the moral contamination in which they resulted that have
given to the world 'the Elmira system, the indeterminate sentence
and the probation system. It is to the same degrading conditions
that our children owe the elaborate provision of reform schools,
detention homes, Juvenile courts and, finally and best of all, a
new body of law for the juvenile delinquent based on the theory
that he is the child of the state, to be saved, instead of a little
demon, to be damned.
And of the elaborate array of motives for punishment which
I have placed before you, it appears that those only which connect themselves with the reformatory movement of the last forty
years have any important or considerable field for investigation,
any ascertainable and commanding facts to bring to light and,
consequently, any future. The next few years will give us new
data of great importance relating to the conditions under which
our criminals are bred, to the obduracy of the incorrigible, to
the capacity of fallen manhood and womanhood under proper
conditions to renew themselves, to the methods by which children
may be saved from lives of crime and shame. But there will be
no facts for him who regards the criminal law as an instrument
for venting hate and wrath on a fallen-and convicted-brother,
none for him who would keep his fellow man in subjection to his
iron law by terror, none for him who would work redemption
through another's suffering. All these, coming with empty hands,
shall abide as they are until the judgment. But the bringers of
good tidings shall enter in and be prospered.
Let no one doubt that the new spirit which has found its way
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into the law will soon penetrate into every fiber of its structure.
The new moral atmosphere which has made every man his brother's
keeper will be felt in the law courts as well as in the home- and
street. The new attitude of the state toward the child of tender
years will soon mark her attitude toward her erring children of
larger growth. There will be no more criminals to be hated and
punished, but weak and fallen brothers and sisters to be cherished
and saved-saved that they may live, that the state may live. It
has been a long journey from the era of hatred and contempt,
but the end of the reign of terror is in sight.

